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The aim of this research is to explore more effective strategies to build leadership 
groups for the implementation of policies whose success depends on the massive 
mobilisation of targets. The underlying motivation for this work stems from the 
observation of a weak participation by traders in modernising a city’s centre commerce 
in spite of high financial incentives. The analysis of the leadership – the board in charge 
of the trade association-  whose main task was to lead this initiative, showed a poor 
performance in diffusing information. Using combinatorial optimisation techniques, two 
new leadership groups are built. The three leadership groups’ performance in the 
diffusion of information is evaluated and compared. This reveals that, with the tools of 
social network analysis and combinatorial optimisation, the choice of leaders for policy 
processes can be improved.  
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Introduction 
Competent leadership is a valuable resource for a collective engaged in a 
common task (Mellucci, 1996; Obershall, 1973; Ostrom, 1995; Taylor, 1987). Often 
collectives are unable to accomplish their task in an efficient and effective manner as they 
lack a resourceful leadership.  
The leadership role, which may be very attractive in large, prestigious or 
powerful organisations, is not attractive in small, low prestige or powerless organisations 
which are unable to reward accordingly the extra effort of the leadership role. In the latter 
leadership is voluntary work, has low status, and it is subject to frequent attack by lower 
status members (Mellucci, 1996; Obershall, 1973). For these reasons finding the best 
individuals (or just any individuals at all) to occupy leadership positions is not an easy 
task. 
In this paper we compare three different methodologies of building leadership 
groups whose mission is to mobilise individuals to participate in a policy program. The 
value added of this research is twofold:  
a) It uses social network analysis (SNA) with optimisation as a tool to analyse 
mobilisation in contexts of policy implementation. The concept of network here has 
been given different meanings (e.g. Thatcher, 1998). One version of the policy network 
approach calls attention to the several interdependent actors involved in all stages of the 
policy making process (e.g. Klijn, 1997). This line of study tends to view networks as a 
specific form of governance structure, and uses the concept metaphorically. Research 
following this approach has failed to explain the policy process and has produced 
mostly descriptive studies (e.g. Dowding, 1995).  
 Another version views networks as relations - that can be measured and 
visualized - among actors. This view is consistent with that of social network analysts, 
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who do a systematic analysis of the pattern of interdependencies among the actors 
involved in any collective action, such as policy making4. This version has the potential 
to explain policy outcomes taking into account the network characteristics, but so far 
has produced insufficient explanatory research (Pappi and Henning, 1998; Carlsson, 
2000; Thatcher, 1998), particularly concerning policy implementation. 
 b) It combines SNA with combinatorial optimisation techniques in which 
actors’ attributes are taken into account. Borgatti (2006) acknowledged the interest of 
incorporating actor attributes, but so far this problem has not raised the interest of social 
scientists. 
The baseline of this study is a leadership group, empirically observed, in charge 
of the modernisation of a city centre’s commerce. Using combinatorial optimisation 
techniques two new alternative leadership groups are constructed. The three leadership 
groups are then evaluated and compared.  
  The empirically observed leadership group is the board of the trade association 
whose role is to induce traders to engage in the modernisation of their commerce, in 
particular through adhesion to a policy program offering financial incentives to those who 
remodel their shops. The success of this program, like most other policy programs, 
depends on the massive participation of targets. We consider that, given the situation 
under study, the two main tasks of leadership are to inform the target actors about the 
program, and to mobilise potential participants. Access to reliable information is of 
crucial importance for anyone having to take risky decisions, in this case, whether to 
participate or not in the program. A target actor’s decision to participate is affected by a 
number of issues e.g. time spent on the application procedure, financial matters, 
disclosure of internal affairs to program sponsors, credibility of the program. Those better 
                                                 
4For a general reference on social network analysis see Wasserman and Faust (1994). 
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informed reduce such risk. Here the performance of leadership is operationalised as 
reachability capacity. Reach is defined as the number of people that board members 
can contact directly. Following Marwell and Oliver (1993) we also emphasise the idea of 
selectivity as the ability to communicate with those members of a network "who are 
most 1ikely to contribute or who are likely to contribute the most" (p. 130). The ability 
to select is important because in heterogeneous collectives one person may be willing and 
able to contribute much more than another5. Through simulations of actors’ mobilisation 
for collective action, Marwell and Oliver (1993) concluded that “the optimal strategy for 
organizers is one of "high reach and high selectivity"6 where everyone in the network 
is contacted, particularly those with the highest interests and resources”. But, they 
recognize that “the costs of this option are often prohibitive”. The alternatives, 
according to them, would be the strategies of "high reach and low selectivity" or "low 
reach and high selectivity", the first implying an impersonal, mass-mediated approach to 
getting messages to network members, and the second a personalized, communication 
networks approach. Given some relevant characteristics of our case study, such as the 
complexity of the message to be diffused, the heterogeneity of targets (who belong to 
different age groups and have firms of different dimensions, with different levels of 
performance, etc.) and the context of competition and low trust among traders (Varanda, 
2005), a message of high reach low selectivity or low reach high selectivity would not be 
sufficient. Only a message of high reach and high selectivity is appropriate.  
The methodology for group formation to be presented here aims to facilitate the 
task of leaders who must attain both goals simultaneously: to reach the maximum number 
                                                 
5 When groups are homogeneous, everyone is interchangeable, and the collective outcome is a simple 
function of how many people participate ( Marwell and Oliver, 1993). 
6 Obviously, selectivity requires information about how interested each person is in the collective 
good, as well as their personal level of resources as an indicator of how much each is able or likely 
to give. This also suggests that the organizers need to know how to craft messages that focus on 
maximizing benefits for contributors while minimizing their costs (Marwell and Oliver, 1993). 
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of traders who need information to take a decision about participation7. This methodology 
involves a great knowledge of the collective and its social organisation and composition, 
which may entail high costs for the organisers of collective action, but is a necessary 
condition for the success of policy implementation (Wellner, 2008). Authors, such as  
Crozier and  Friedberg (1977), have focused policy makers’ limitations  in conceiving 
good policies, due, if for no other reason, to the incapacity of obtaining quality 
information about the social system (communities, organisations, cities…). Often good 
technical and economic information about the problems is obtained, but it is forgotten that 
these can only be solved through “concrete systems of action”, which are not reducible to 
material problems, and do not mechanically obey and follow the decisions of policy 
makers.  
Unfortunately, most policy programs are conceived in total ignorance of the 
“concrete system of action” of the collective over which they want to intervene. It is not 
surprising that many policy programs rarely achieve their initial goals (Pressman & 
Wildavsky, 1973) and may even lead to perverse effects (Palumbo, 1987). The program 
we observed empirically is no different. Despite high financial incentives, it failed to 
mobilise traders: only 25,5%8 participated9. This level of participation was considered to 
be low by policymakers and traders alike, and in consequence there was no effective 
modernisation of the city centre commerce . City centre commerce in Portugal in general, 
and in this city centre in particular , is old-fashioned and unable  to attract consumers (for 
an overview about city centre commerce in Portugal see Salgueiro 1996, Cachinho 2001, 
Varanda 2005). As such only a massive participation would result in  real  modernisation.  
                                                 
7 Some do not need information because they have already made a decision (i.e. whether to participate or 
not).  
8 This level of participation was very similar to that observed in average value for this same policy 
program in the whole country. 
9 For a thorough description of this study and the explanation for the failure in modernisation see Varanda 
(2005). 
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Some authors, for instance Strang and Soule (1998) and Ostrom (1998), have called for 
the need to examine collective action processes that fail, as there is a strong bias in 
research towards successful cases. It is agreed that obtaining more information on failed 
attempts and why they failed will shed light on those that do not fail.  
 
 
1. The case study 
 
1.1 A global overview 
This case study focuses on the implementation of policies envisaging the 
modernisation of commerce in the historic city centre of a mid size town in Portugal. City 
centre commerce has suffered from the growing competition of large scale retail outlets  
(shopping centres and hypermarkets, mostly located on the peripheries), and policy 
makers contend that with no external incentives this type of commerce will tend to 
disappear, leading to the desertification of city centres. In this paper we focus on a policy 
program  in which the Portuguese government together with the European Union offered 
traders a financial incentive up to 66,6% of their investment10. All traders located in the 
city centre – commerce, coffee shop or restaurant owners - could apply. The general 
understanding was that the financial incentive was quite high in comparison with that of  
other programs. Moreover, this program was more attractive than most other programs in 
that it accepted all applications, that is, everyone applying would obtain the incentive. For 
those whose application was deemed average, rather than high quality, the incentive was 
50% of the investment. However, a number of costs are attached to the participation, such 
                                                 
10 This specific program was called Urban Commercial Project and was part of a larger program called 
PROCOM. Today a similar program called URBCOM is in place. This case study took place from 1999 
until 2001. 
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as the inevitable share of traders’ own capital investment, the low credibility of these 
governmental programs (e.g. delays in the payment of incentives) and the bureaucratic 
load attached. The benefit of having a nice looking shop, besides being a motive of pride 
and increasing the owner’s status, is the expected increase in sales. But, unlike costs, this 
is more difficult to anticipate and quantify, because it is affected by external factors, such 






Data on the traders’ attributes and relations were obtained through a 
questionnaire for the universe of traders. Traders were questioned about discussion 
relations concerning the program, and discussion relations concerning the situation of the 
city’s commerce in general. This questionnaire was applied 6-9 months prior to the 
adhesion deadline.  
Discussion amongst colleagues about matters concerning the business may seem 
trivial in many occupations, in which the interdependence among colleagues is well 
known and the exchange of resources is a necessary condition for good performance. 
However, in the context of commerce, in which independence and confidentiality are 
highly appreciated, discussing anything that relates to the profession is an important sign 
of openness to collective matters11. 
                                                 
11 This measure has limitations if we think that the coordination of effort involves not only 
communication, but also influence and enforcement (Marwell & Oliver, 1993). We do not question this, 
but in this paper we are simply concerned with the reachability aspect. Nonetheless, in contexts where 
actors are competitors valuing the secrecy of their strategies, discussion relations are more meaningful 
than they would be in a context where individuals openly discuss among themselves. 
 8
The traders’ network is a graph representation of the city centre traders and their 
relationships. Each node of the traders’ network represents a trader eligible for the 
program. Given a pair of nodes, a link exists between them if the corresponding traders 
share information.  
Based on the sociometric data, we have obtained the following structure for the traders’ 
network: 
• one component composed of 159 nodes and 304 edges. 
• one component composed of 2 nodes  
• 31 isolated nodes 
Even a quick look at this network structure, composed of a large number of 
isolates, denotes the difficulty of wide diffusion of information in the collective. From 
now on we will restrict our analysis to the largest component, as access to the two node 
component and the isolated nodes would be enormous for any leadership group willing to 
mobilize traders.  
We will denote by V  the set of nodes of the largest component and by E  its set 
of edges. The density of this graph, 2.4%, indicates that information diffusion among 
members of this collective is quite poor. 
Based on the literature on small commerce and on our knowledge of the field, 
we know that the information circulating among traders came up against the obstacle of 
suspiciousness. Since, in the context of commerce, secrecy is the rule of the game, in our 






1.3 The leadership of the city centre: the board of the trade association  
 
The leader of this initiative in the city studied was the local trade association12. 
We should note that traders are a group that traditionally resist associative strategies 
(Hosgood, 1992). According to Bechhofer and  Elliott (1981) they are “loners , not 
joiners” (p. 195). The trade association studied is typical for the Portuguese context: it 
had a small number of associates – 1600 – and just three staff, two administrative and one 
technical, which was hired at the time of the program. Just prior to launching the program 
the trade association was undergoing a leadership crisis; there was no elected board, 
instead, two traders were in charge of administrative matters. One of these traders, who 
had been a member of past boards, viewed the program as a great opportunity to revive 
the city centre commerce and took the initiative of inviting colleagues to form a board of 
directors. He invited six other traders – this particular trade association had a board of 7 
directors - following the lines of friendship/acquaintanceship and perceived competence. 
The board perceived the policy program as a historic moment for modernisation of the 
city centre, and as an effort to recover the market share they had been losing to large scale 
retail outlets. Another important initiative of this board was to extend opening hours on 
Saturday from morning only to morning and afternoon, a time schedule that was not 
practised by the majority of traders in the city centre but was usual practice in large scale 
retail outlets. This was considered a controversial initiative especially among older traders 
who were used to having Saturday afternoons as rest periods (for more details see 
Varanda, (2005)).  
                                                 
12 We should note that the program also supported a marketing campaign to be conducted by the trade 
association. The association’s financial incentive was calculated as a proportion of the total amount of 
investment of individual traders. 
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  This particular board is composed of seven members, all male, two of whom are 
not eligible for the program13. These two board members, plus a third one who is an 
isolate, have no representation in node set V. The average age of the five eligible board 
members is 50 (only one of them is aged under 40), and they are all commerce owners, 
i.e. no one owns coffee-shops or restaurants. Their business’ performance either has been 
going up or is stable and their shops are all concentrated in just two of the city centre 
streets (we have considered a total of 30 streets/alleys/squares). All but one open the shop 
Saturday afternoons, and all but one are planning to adhere to the policy program. With 
regard to reachability, the board of the trade association14 has direct links to 45 other 
traders. This means that 110 traders are not directly reached by the board. For a leadership 
group whose main mission is to develop the program in the city centre the low 
reachability can be considered a poor diffusion of information. This observation was the 
motivation underlying the theoretical construction of alternative boards. 
 
 
2. Boards’ construction 
 
In this section we present the theory - sociological and/or mathematical-  that 
underpins the construction of the three boards analysed: the board that was empirically 
observed, which acts as our baseline, and two theoretically constructed boards. 
 
                                                 
13One of them was not eligible because his business was located outside the city centre and another 
because his field of business was not considered eligible by the incentive program. These two members 
were not included in the sociomatrix. This was not considered problematic as they were not cited by any 
of the eligible traders.  
14Here just 4 board members were taken into account – those represented in node set V - because, as we 
said, two were not eligible and a third one was isolated. Through field work we found out that he was not 
involved in the city’s commerce and his participation on the board was also diminishing (for instance he 
was frequently absent from meetings).  
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2.1 Acquaintanceship board 
 
The tendency of individuals in general is to interact preferentially with people 
similar to them (Hinds et al., 2000). This has been designated as homophily tendency 
(Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1954)15. For this reason leadership teams in general, and of 
policy makers or boards of directors in particular, are very homogeneous (Middleton, 
1987). But their homogeneity contrasts with the usual heterogeneity of the collective over 
which they rule. It is known that homophily reduces the psychological discomfort that 
may arise from cognitive or emotional inconsistency (Heider, 1958), and reduces the 
potential areas of conflict in relationships (Sherif, 1958). It is also known that, in groups 
of similar people, communication is easier and behaviour more predictable, which foster 
trust and reciprocity (Brass, 1995). Groups with such characteristics are expected to have 
high levels of group cohesion. However research findings on group cohesion do not 
support a solid and positive relation between cohesiveness and either individual or group 
performance (Mudrack, 1989; Levine and Moreland, 1990). Part of this has to do with the 
definition of cohesion (Levine and Moreland, 1990), and whether the definitions has a 
personal or task orientation to it (Zaccaro & Lowe, 2001). It is known that in groups in 
which the basis of cohesiveness is a shared commitment to the group task, rather than the 
maintenance of the interpersonal harmony, group performance may be better. In fact, a 
highly interpersonal orientation can create problems for a group and its members. 
According to Flache and Macy (1996), once friendships are established based on 
unconditional approval, it becomes much harder to change the rules of the game, so that 
approval becomes based on compliance with group norms. Strong ties may pose an 
                                                 
15 For a more recent approach and literature review concerning this concept, see for instance Mcpherson 
et al. (2001). 
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insurmountable second order free rider problem. By contrast, if cohesiveness is measured 
as a shared commitment to the group task, group norms would still be strong but rather 
than serve interpersonal comfort, they would encourage performance, productivity and 
efficacy (Hackman, 1995; Sakurai 1975). In any case it is always difficult to have people 
move beyond a focus on their personal rewards to focus on the achievement of collective 
goals. The right group composition, the right working context and the right leadership 
have to be in place.  
Even if interpersonal cohesion has proved irrelevant for group performance, it is 
known that individuals prefer to work with others who are similar and with those they 
like. Working in a heterogeneous group is more complex in the sense that communication 
and coordination are more difficult, making it harder to obtain consensus on critical or 
controversial issues. More negotiation must be undertaken, which consumes additional 
time and energy. But, on the other hand, the decisions coming out of it add more value to 
the group and are much more likely to be adopted and implemented by a greater number. 
If this group has to lead a collective with an heterogeneous character, the only way to be 
representative is by having a truly heterogeneous leadership. A homogeneous leadership 
alienates part of the collective (Halliday & Capell, 1979). 
 
 
2.2 Key player model 
 
Some limitations to homogeneous groups composed on the basis of friendship 
ties can better be evaluated if compared to a group whose membership is selected for  
their optimal location in the network. Finding such a group involves looking for a set of 
nodes - key players - optimally positioned to quickly diffuse information, attitudes, 
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behaviours or goods. As asserted by Borgatti (2006), “the problem of identifying key 
players [meaning the most important individuals in a given collective] in social networks 
(...) is an old one”, and most work so far has relied on actors centrality for that effect. The 
limitations of this strategy have been shown by Everett and Borgatti (1999). 
Borgatti (2006) proposes a new approach to the key player problem and defines 
two separate key player problems: the key player problem negative and the key player 
problem positive. The key player problem positive is defined as follows: given a social 
network, find a set of k nodes called a kp-set such that the kp-set is maximally connected 
to all other nodes. In this work we are interested in the following version of the key player 
problem positive: to find a set of k nodes (board directors) such that the number of nodes 
















This combinatorial optimisation problem, referred to as (KP) from now on, may be 
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Constraints (2) state that for a node i to be covered there must be at least one key 
player j linked to i. Constraint (3) states that at most k nodes may be key players. 
Conditions (4) and (5) are integrality constraints. 
Model (KP) is a covering problem known in the literature as the maximum covering 
location model (Daskin, 1995). The maximum covering location model on a general 
network is NP-complete (Garey and Johnson, 1979).  
The key player set obtained from model (KP) solves the reachability problem 
but may endanger the cohesiveness of the group. If, for instance, one wishes to select the 
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set of key players of a collective that is highly heterogeneous, one must expect that the 
actors optimally located are themselves heterogeneous. By optimally choosing leaders a 
trade-off is made between homogeneity and reachability. Our concern with homogeneity, 
as we have seen, has to do not so much with the level of interpersonal cohesion but with 
the level of task cohesion, which is considered to have an impact on the group 
performance. By using this methodology we are not able to achieve the right mix of 
individuals needed for task cohesion. But, even when recruitment is done on a personal 
basis, the right mix is not easy to achieve. This is so because competence is difficult to 
evaluate, especially in a context where actors work independently from each other, and 
are recruited to perform tasks other than those they are known for doing well. Moreover it 
must be borne in mind that the level of group cohesion is a dynamic process: it may grow 
or decrease.  
It could also be argued that this group formation methodology is inadequate 
because it fails to select those with the highest levels of motivation and commitment to 
the group task. Optimally positioned group members are not, a priori, motivated for the 
task at hand, but again, neither may acquaintances/friends be (even if the latter are, a 
priori, more easily convinced by the organiser). When members of the group are selected 
through an optimisation technique and tentatively recruited, and if they are not motivated 
or interested on the project to start with, two things may happen:  
- the recruiter/organiser may be able to raise their interest, given the importance of 
the task at hand and/or by offering rewards such as good working conditions, competent 
staff, etc; or 
- they may simply refuse the invitation, and in this case the recruiter will have to 
look for the next optimally positioned actor. 
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Throughout this discussion we have taken for granted the existence of a highly 
interested individual who engages in group formation. We agree with Marwell et al. 
(1988), who say that “organiser centred mobilisations are the rule rather than the 
exception and that most collective goods are produced by actions that originate with one 
person, (or a few people) who plans a campaign and purposely seeks to draw others into 
it” (p. 529). If the organiser has high status and resources, the task will be easier. His/her 
tendency, as we have seen, will be to recruit among a pool of friends/acquaintances. But 
this organiser, given knowledge of the individuals who are more resourceful and a better 
warrant of task accomplishment even if they are not similar or well known, will  probably 
not discard recruitment along those lines. Because they are highly driven to achieve the 
final objective, they may engage in the more difficult but more effective strategy. 
  In conclusion, a leadership that is optimally selected improves reachability, and 
does not necessarily put at stake its contribution to collective action. If the right context is 
reached, one in which cooperation is valued, it can perform well. Nonetheless the 
organiser and the resources he/she can mobilise play a crucial role in this process. 
 
2.3  Attributes key player model 
 
Model (KP) maximizes reachability but disregards the attributes of traders. This 
can be a problem. The literature on processes of diffusion of innovation and on the 
mobilisation for collective action has shown the relevance of considering actor attributes 
together with the relational contexts in which they are embedded. Marwell and Oliver 
(1993) have asserted that the production of collective action depends on the initiative of a 
sub-group comprising the most interested and resourceful, who through their behaviour 
influence others to participate. In the literature pertaining to mobilisation for social 
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movements, some examples of relevant attributes are the actors’ cultural and ideological 
identification with the movement as well as with their leaders (Mellucci, 1996), their past 
participation in other movements, their current membership in other social movement 
organisations, the biographical circumstances of a person’s life, and the expectation 
toward the movement’ success (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1988). In addition, Rogers 
(1995) has shown that leaders of innovative processes tend to be found among those who 
have higher formal education, own larger economic units (firms, lands, boats...) and are  
more cosmopolitan and better informed about the innovation. However the relevant 
characteristics of leaders change according to the characteristics of the social system 
(Rogers, 1995).  
On the basis of this literature into account we will develop a new model called 
the attributes key player model to select a set of leaders based on both attributes and 
reachability criteria. The attributes to consider in such models are those that through 
fieldwork were found to potentially influence participation in collective action. These can 
be age, success, status, place of birth or attitudes (among others), since they will vary 
according to the context specificities. In our case, since our purpose is to illustrate an 
alternative methodology, we have selected the attribute “attitude towards participation in 
the program” only. 
We consider that, to be part of the board, traders must show interest in adhering 
to the program. It is our supposition that this show of interest is a necessary condition to 
qualify as a potential board member who has to engage in the task of diffusing 
information about the program. When building a team to mobilise others to a policy 
program, their members must themselves be adherents of that initiative. In the attributes 
key player model only traders that show interest in adhering to the program will be 
considered candidates to be members of the board. 
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  In addition, assuming that no set composed of k traders is able to reach all other 
traders in one link, only traders whose attributes will potentially favour the boards’ 
mission of modernising the city centre commerce will be considered as targets. As such 
the targets will be the traders who have not yet made up their minds about participating. 
Let B be the set of traders who have decided to adhere to the program and T be 
the set of target traders, i.e., those who have not yet reached a decision. 
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The meaning of the objective function and the constraints of model (AKP) is similar to 
model (KP). In (6) the number of traders who have not yet made up their minds about 
participating covered by the board directors is maximized. In (7), (8), and (9) only traders 
who show interest in adhering to the program are allowed to be part of the board. Model 




3. Board description 
This section contains a characterisation of the two theoretically created boards – 
key player and attributes key player – according to their composition and reachability 
performance  
 
3.1 Key player board 
 
Since the acquaintanceship board is composed of seven members value k was set 
to 7 in model (KP). The greedy adding algorithm for the maximum covering location 
model (Daskin, 1995) was then used to find an approximate solution to (KP).  
To evaluate the quality of the key player board obtained from the greedy 
heuristic we have computed an upper bound, UB, on the value of the optimal solution to 
(KP) by solving its linear relaxation. The commercial package Cplex 8.0 (ILOG, 2002) 
was used to compute this bound. The solution obtained from the greedy algorithm was 
then evaluated using the standard formula, %100×−
UB
LBUB , where LB is equal to the 
number of nodes covered by the key player board obtained from the greedy heuristic. As 
in this case, LBUB = , the key player board obtained from the greedy heuristic is optimal.  
The optimal key player board is composed of five men and two women. The 
average age is 41 and four directors are aged below 40. The group has six commerce 
owners and one coffee-shop owner. Their businesses are spread out in six different 
locations of the city centre. Most of them run a successful business (only one had a 
business which was not doing well). Three of them are planning to adhere to the policy 
program, while five open their shops on Saturdays. We should also note that the key 
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player board has two members in common with the acquaintanceship board: the president 
of the board and the trader who had been in charge of the association prior to election. 
These are the two actors with the highest centrality degree in this network. With regard to 
reachability the key player team has direct links to 72 other traders. In total there are 79 
traders with first hand or one link away information. This means that the board is unable 




3.2 Attributes key player board 
To obtain the attributes’ key player board, we considered model (AKP) with 
k=7. As in the case of the key player board, the greedy adding algorithm was used to 
obtain a feasible solution to the problem. This solution was evaluated using the same 
formula as that for the key player solution and was also proven optimal. 
The attributes key player board is composed of five men and two women. The 
average age is 50 and there is only one director aged below 40. There are two coffee shop 
owners in the group. Within the group three traders recognise that the business is not 
going well. Their businesses are placed in five different locations, and all of them open 
the shop on Saturday afternoons. Like the key player board this board is quite 
heterogeneous in its composition. This board shares three members with the 
acquaintanceship board. The attributes key player board reaches 61 traders, 23 of whom 





3.3 The three boards compared 
 
The acquaintanceship board is composed of seven members. While two of them 
are not eligible and one is an isolate, all seven members of the key player board are 
eligible for the program. In the key player board three members are unwilling to adhere to 
the program while only traders willing to adhere to the program are included in the 
attributes key player board. Since both key player teams are constructed based on 
previous knowledge about the social network and the rules of the program, it is assured 
that no one relevant for the success of the program was excluded, and that every 
potentially important trader was taken into consideration. 
The key player and attributes key player boards are more heterogeneous than the 
acquaintanceship board. While no women are members of the acquaintanceship board, the 
key player and the attributes board comprise both men and women. The members’ age is 
lower in the key player board and identical in the acquaintanceship and attributes’ key 
player boards. The key player and the attributes key player boards have members in 
different types of businesses and placed in more locations than the acquaintanceship 
board. The heterogeneous character of both key player and attributes key player boards, as 
compared to the homogenous character of the acquaintanceship board is easily explained 
by the methods followed for their constitution - recruitment through friendship and 
acquaintanceship ties vs. optimisation. As we have mentioned above, the main 
mechanisms that drive relationships are similarity, predictability, and comfort. In the key 
player and attributes key player boards all subgroups of the city centre commerce are 
represented: men and women, commerce and coffee-shops, young and old, traders from 
main and secondary streets, those who are successful as well as those whose business is 
declining. In this sense, these boards are much more representative of the city centre 
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traders. With regard to diffusion of information the heterogeneous group performs better. 
Nonetheless heterogeneous groups have to engage in more negotiation during the 
decision-making process, which has costs namely in terms of time and energy. But there 
are benefits too as negotiation can generate positive sum solutions to problems and make 
innovation more probable. The information obtained through field work show that even a 
homogeneous group formed through the lines of acquaintanceship/friendship and 
perceived competence may engender negative work dynamics. We observed that the level 
of cohesiveness within the current board was falling. This was perceptible in the low 
participation by some members at board meetings and in the general activity of the trade 
association, and even in the disrespect of board decisions by its members. Since group 
work is a dynamic process, we can expect both declining cohesion in a group that started 
out as very cohesive and increasing cohesion in a group that started out with low 
cohesiveness.  
The acquaintanceship board reaches 45 traders, the key player board reaches 72, 
and the attributes key player board reaches 61 traders. In the set of traders reached by the 
acquaintanceship board only 12 are undecided. The remaining 33 traders have already 
reached a decision on their adhesion. The numbers of undecided traders for the key player 
and the attributes key player boards are, respectively, 18 and 23. Since the total number of 
undecided traders in the network is 47, the acquaintanceship board, the key player board 
and the attributes key player board reach 26%, 38%, and 49% of the undecided traders, 
respectively. Although the key player solution represents an improvement compared to 
the acquaintanceship board, its blindness to attributes, leads to a choice of directors who 
are not the most competent diffusers of information. As has been shown, the attributes 
key player board is an optimal solution to model (AKP). This means that, with a board 
composed of seven members that are willing to adhere to the program, at most 23 out of 
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the 47 target traders can be reached. In order to reach more target traders, an attributes 




The aim of this paper was to show that social network analysis together with 
combinatorial optimisation techniques are useful in the identification of key players in a 
collective whose task is to diffuse information. We have shown that the solution to the 
key player problem as presented by Borgatti (2006) - although optimal- may not be 
sophisticated enough to identify the most competent key players. For that reason we 
propose a modification of the key player problem, named attributes key player problem, 
which simultaneously takes into consideration actors’ positions in the network and their 
attributes. We showed that this modification of the key player problem improved the 
choice of key players whose task was simplistically reduced to that of diffusing 
information. 
We have also shown the limitations of a group formed on the basis of 
friendship/acquaintanceship criteria, that is following the homophily principle, as 
compared to a group formed based on optimisation criteria. When the collective is 
heterogeneous, the optimal leadership will necessarily be heterogeneous, and thus more 
representative. Thus in a collective that must adopt innovative behaviours the group 
leading the process has to be carefully chosen in order to avoid the trend toward 
homogeneity for such a trend will necessarily lead to low reachability. 
Based on the network structure of this collective we have also shown that the 
policy implementation would never succeed if the task is to be undertaken solely by the 
board of the trade association. Prior to intervention the State, as the promoter and ultimate 
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responsible of the program’s success, should have procured any additional resources that 
are needed. Ignoring this led to a waste of energy and resources. In markets composed of 
small independent firms that are competitors, the board of directors of the trade 
association may be incapable of massive mobilisation on its own. Policy makers should 
invest additional resources in devising and implementing new forms of diffusing 
information, rather than focusing solely on the attribution of financial incentives, which 
do not seem to have a strong effect on participation. 
The limitations and problems of this work can only be fully apprehended after 
replication in other cases of collective action. The application in our case study is only an 
illustration. The data set used for our study, due to its low density, may not be ideal for 
methodological illustrative purposes. However, if we wish to study a collective where 
information exchange is rare and where mistrust abounds, one would not expect a very 
different network structure. 
Another limitation has to do with the choice of just one attribute for board 
members and target actors. Other attributes could be added if considered meaningful for 
the selection of board members and target actors. But again, given the low density of this 
network, the choice of more attributes would not improve the explanatory objective of 
this paper. 
In short, the objective of this paper was to serve as an illustration of how 
organisers of collective action given a knowledge of the “concrete social action” of the 
system and actor attributes may reduce the complexity of their task and the time and 
energy wasted, and consequently be more efficient and effective. With the tools of social 
network analysis and combinatorial optimisation, policy implementation processes could 
be made easier and more effective by helping with the choice of leaders and with the 
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